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NO. 39557 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael A. Gandenberger appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation and executing his sentence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2005, Gandenberger was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child 
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under sixteen for conduct involving his seven-year-old niece. (6/20/05 PSI, pp.1-2; 
State's Exhibit 2.) The district court granted a withheld judgment and placed 
Gandenberger on probation for four years. (State's Exhibit 2.) In 2010, Gandenberger 
was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and of a misdemeanor violation of 
I.C. §18-8329 for living at a residence within 500 feet of a school. (12/9/10 PSI, pp.1-2; 
R., pp.149-158.) On the felony charge, the district court imposed a unified five-year 
sentence with one year fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Gandenberger 
on supervised probation for five years. (R., pp.149-158.) 
In 2011, Gandenberger told a law enforcement officer that he sexually touched a 
three-year-old relative who was sleeping inside the house during a barbeque. (R., 
p.173; 11/22/11 Tr., p.16, L.15 - p.17, L.4.) The state filed a report of probation 
violation, alleging that Gandenberger violated his probation by committing a new crime, 
and by initiating, maintaining, or establishing conduct with a minor without the presence 
of an approved supervisor. (R., pp.173-175.) 
At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, Gandenberger argued that his admission 
to the law enforcement officer was the product of a delusion brought about by his 
condition of paranoid schizophrenia. (12/6/11 Tr., p.12, L.11 - p.13, L.21.) 
Gandenberger presented testimony from a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner 
who discussed Gandenberger's mental illness. (11/22/11 Tr., p.39, L.9 - p.48, L.16.) 
He also presented testimony from two adult relatives who were present at the barbeque, 
and who both testified that Gandenberger had no opportunity to be alone with his 
alleged victim there. (11/22/11 Tr., p.49, L.18- p.59, L.12; 12/6/11 Tr., p.4, L.3- p.10, 
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L.18.) 
The district court concluded that the state failed to prove by a preponderance of 
evidence that Gandenberger violated his probation by committing a new offense by 
abusing a minor. (12/6/11 Tr., p.20, L.20 - p.22, L.6.) However, the court also 
concluded that the state proved Gandenberger violated his probation by initiating, 
maintaining, or establishing conduct with minors present at the barbeque without the 
presence of an approved supervisor. (12/6/11 Tr., p.17, L.9 - p.19, L.16.) The district 
court revoked Gandenberger's probation and executed the original unified sentence of 




Gandenberger states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether, absent any substantial and competent evidence to support a 
finding that Mr. Gandenberger willfully violated the terms of his probation, the 
district court's decision to revoke Mr. Gandenberger's probation was in error. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Gandenberger failed to show that the district court erred in revoking his 
probation and executing his sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
Gandenberger Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Revoking His 
Probation And Executing His Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Gandenberger asserts that the district court erred by revoking his probation. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-19.) Specifically, Gandenberger contends that I.C.R. 33(e), 
which was amended in 2012 to require courts to find a willful probation violation before 
revoking probation, applied retroactively to his 2011 probation violation hearings. (Id.) 
Gandenberger contends that the district court violated this rule by revoking his probation 
without finding a willful violation. (Id.) In the alternative, Gandenberger contends that 
even if the newly amended I.C.R. 33(e) did not apply retroactively to his probation 
hearings, the district court erred by failing to consider alternatives to incarceration 
before revoking probation. (Id.) 
Gandenberger's argument fails because the amended I.C.R. 33(e) is a 
procedural court rule enacted and amended by the Idaho Supreme Court, that does not 
apply retroactively to hearings conducted before the amendment became effective. 
Further, substantial evidence in the record exists to show that Gandeberger's probation 
violation was willful, and in any event, the district court considered several alternatives 
to incarceration before revoking Gandenberger's probation. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. Lafferty, 125 
Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
This Court will not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility 
of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 207, 953 P.2d 645, 
647 (Ct. App. 1988). 
C. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e), As Newly Amended. Does Not Apply Retroactively To 
Prior Probation Violation Hearings 
At the time of the 2011 probation violation hearings in the present case, I.C.R. 
33(e) read as follows: 
The court shall not revoke probation except after hearing at which 
the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such 
action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such 
hearing. 
I.C.R. 33(e), 2011; see also 2/9/12 Idaho Supreme Court Order, "In Re: Amendments of 
Idaho Criminal Rules (I.C.R.) 6.6, 16, 25(a), 33, 41(a), 43 and 54.11." 
In 2012, the Idaho Supreme Court amended I.C.R. 33(e) to include the following 
sentence: "The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the 
defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully 
violated a condition of probation." (2/9/12 Idaho Supreme Court Order.) The Court 
1 For the Court's convenience, a copy of the Idaho Supreme Court's February 9, 2012 
order amending I.C.R. 33 is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
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specifically ordered that the amendment become effective July 1, 2012. (Id.) 
Citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352-353 (2004), and Rhoades v. 
State, 149 Idaho 130, 139, 233 P.3d 61, 70 (2010), Gandenberger asserts that the 
amended I.C.R. 33(e) is a "new substantive rule" that applies retroactively to his 2011 
probation hearings, and that the district court thus violated I.C.R. 33(e) by revoking his 
probation and executing the original sentence without finding a willful violation. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Gandenberger is incorrect. 
In Schriro, the United States Supreme Court discussed the retroactive application 
of "new rules" resulting from opinions of that Court. Schriro, 542 at 351-358 (holding 
that the "new rule" from Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that statutory aggravators 
that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty must be decided by a jury, is not 
subject to retroactive application); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 292-316 
(1989) (setting forth the relevant retroactivity criteria for new procedural and substantive 
rules resulting from opinions of the United States Supreme Court). In Rhoades, the 
Idaho Supreme Court adopted the "Teague approach" when determining whether 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of Idaho should 
be given retroactive effect in Idaho. Rhoades. 149 Idaho at 135-139, 233 P.3d at 66-70. 
None of these cases address the retroactivity of procedural2 criminal rules 
2 Contrary to Gandenberger's contention, I.C.R. 33(e) and the Idaho Criminal Rules are 
procedural, by virtue of the Idaho Supreme Court's inherent authority under which they 
are promulgated. See State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863, 541, 828 P.2d 891, 892 
(1992) ("A careful reading of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and the legislature's 
codification of the Idaho Supreme Court's rule making power, reveals that this Court's 
rule making power goes to procedural, as opposed to substantive, rules.") (emphasis in 
original). 
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enacted and amended by the Idaho Supreme Court through its inherent authority. Cf. 
State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175, 177 P.3d 387, 389 (2008) ("The inherent power of 
the Idaho Supreme Court to make rules governing procedure in all the courts of Idaho, 
including the formulation of rules of criminal practice and procedure, has long been 
recognized" (citations omitted)). In this instance, the Idaho Supreme Court utilized its 
inherent authority to amend I.C.R. 33(e), and to order the amendment effective as of 
July 1, 2012. (2/9/12 Idaho Supreme Court Order.) The amended rule did not apply to 
hearings prior to the effective date established by the Idaho Supreme Court, including 
Gandenberger's 2011 probation violation hearings. 
Gandenberger has failed to show that the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e) 
applied retroactively to his 2011 probation violation hearings. He has likewise failed to 
show that the district court erred in failing to apply an amended rule which had not yet 
become effective. 
D. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Revoking Gandenberger's 
Probation And Executing The Original Sentence 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions 
of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 
Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 
1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989). 
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district 
court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion." 
Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (quoting State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 
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529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)). If, however, the violation "was not willful, or 
was beyond the probationer's control, a court may not revoke probation and order 
imprisonment without first considering alternative methods to address the violation." 
Leach, 135 Idaho at 529, 20 P.3d at 713. 
Contrary to Gandenberger's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the 
applicable law supports the district court's determination that Gandenber's violation was 
willful, and reveals that the district court considered alternatives to incarceration prior to 
revoking Gandeberger's probation and executing the original sentence. 
1. The State Presented Substantial Evidence That Gandenberger's 
Probation Violation Was Willful 
When considering whether a probation violation was willful, the Idaho appellate 
courts review the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists to show a 
willful violation. See, §.JL., State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 
(Ct. App. 2003); Leach, 135 Idaho at 530-31, 20 P.3d at 714-15; Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 
381,870 P.2d at 1340. 
Term 3 of Gandenberger's Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision required 
that Gandenberger not "initiate, maintain, or establish contact with any person, male or 
female, under the age of 18 years, without the presence of an approved supervisor. 
The supervisor must be over the age of 21 and be approved by both [Gandenberger's] 
supervising officer and therapist." (State's Exhibit 5.) At the evidentiary hearing, 
Gandenberger's probation officer explained that under this standard sex offender term 
of probation, a potential "supervisor" meets with the probation officer and therapist and 
9 
undergoes a background check prior to "approval." (11/22/11 Tr., p.31, L.11 - p.32, 
L.16.) The probation officer also testified that Gandenberger had no approved 
supervisors, and therefore was entirely prohibited from initiating, maintaining, or 
establishing contact with any person, male or female, under the age of 18 years. 
(11/22/11 Tr., p.27, L.6 - p.28, L.5; p.32, L.17 - p.34, L.3.) 
The district court concluded that Gandenberger violated this term of probation. 
(12/6/11 Tr., p.17, L.9- p.19, L.16.) At the disposition hearing, the court stated that the 
violation was "clearly, in my view, a willful violation."3 (12/20/11 Tr., p.34, L.24 - p.35, 
L.5.) There is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's 
conclusion. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Gandenberger's step-father, who lived with 
Gandenberger and was present at the barbeque, indicated that he was unaware of the 
"approval" requirement for supervisors, and that he instead understood Term 3 of 
Gandenberger's Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision to permit Gandenberger to 
have contact with minors as long as he was supervised by any adult. (12/6/11 Tr., p.4, 
L.3 - p.5, L.5; p.9, L.1 - p.10, L.13.) Gandenberger did not testify at the evidentiary 
hearing and did not present evidence regarding his own understanding of Term 3. On 
3 On appeal, Gandenberger contends that the district court did not expressly find that 
the absence of an approved supervisor at the barbeque was "willful." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.8-10.) Such a distinction is of no import to the issue on appeal. When a district court 
finds that a defendant has violated his probation, unless the district court explicitly 
states otherwise, the presumption is that the violation was willful. See State v. 
Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 844 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting the district court "implicitly 
determined that Peterson's disregard of the reporting obligation was willful"). In this 
case, the district court expressly concluded that the violation as a whole was willful, and 
at worst, implicitly determined that the absence of an approved supervisor at the 
barbeque was willful as well. 
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appeal, as at the evidentiary hearing, Gandenberger argues that he misunderstood 
Term 3 of his Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision, and that this 
misunderstanding rendered his violation "unwillful." (12/6/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-7; 
Appellant's brief, pp.7-15.) 
In analyzing whether a probation violation is "willful," or "beyond the probationer's 
control," the Idaho Court of Appeals has considered whether the probationer correctly 
understood a probationary term. See Leach, 135 Idaho at 530-531, 20 P.3d at 714-
715.4 However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has also held that such correct 
understanding of a probationary term could be established by a probationer's 
acknowledgment of the term prior to the commencement of probation. See State v. 
Fife, 114 Idaho 103, 105-106, 753 P.2d 839, 841-842 (Ct. App. 1988). 
In this case, the state presented evidence that Gandenberger acknowledged 
Term 3 of his Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision. The state admitted into 
evidence the agreement itself, which contained Gandenberger's initials next to Term 3, 
as well as his full signature at the bottom of the agreement. (12/6/11 Tr., p.1, L.23 -
4 Idaho Code§ 18-101(1) provides that the term "willfully," "when applied to the intent 
with which an act is done or omitted," "implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit 
the act or make the omission referred to" and "does not require any intent to violate the 
law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage." This definition would indicate 
that a probationer's correct understanding of his probationary terms is not relevant to a 
determination of whether the violation is "willful." However, Leach provides that a court 
may not revoke probation and order imprisonment without first considering alternative 
methods to address the violation if either a violation "was not willful," or if the violation 
was "beyond the probationer's control." Leach, 135 Idaho at 529, 20 P.3d 709 at 713. 
A probation violation may be beyond a probationer's control, if, for example, the term is 
modified without probationer being so notified. In this case, the state asserts that 
evidence that Gandenberger was notified of his probation conditions, and that he 
acknowledged the condition at issue in this case, preclude his claim that the violation 
was "beyond his control." 
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p.2, L.9; State's Exhibit 5.) The state also admitted an Idaho Department of Correction 
Sex Offender In-Office Report, on which Gandenberger answered affirmatively that he 
had "reviewed [his] Court order(s) and/or parole agreement and all signed IDOC 
documents" since being placed on probation. (12/6/11 Tr., p.1, L.23 - p.2, L. 7; State's 
Exhibit 6.) In addition, Term 3 of the agreement was clear, and there was no ambiguity 
as to the requirement that any supervisor be "approved." (State's Exhibit 5.) 
Further, there is substantial evidence in the record that Gandenberger's contact 
with minors at the barbeque was willful. Gandenberger told a law enforcement officer 
that he was present at the barbeque with his cousin's minor daughter. (11/22/11 Tr., 
p.16, Ls.15-20.) Gandenberger's adult cousin testified that her two minor children 
attended the barbeque, and that they interacted with Gandenberger at these events. 
(11/22/11 Tr., p.50, L.9 - p.57, L.2.) Gandenberger's step-father testified that 
Gandenberger was outside during these barbeques, where he "kind of chases [the 
children] around a little bit or plays tag and stuff like that." (12/6/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-22; 
p.8, Ls.22-25.) 
The record reveals that substantial evidence was presented at the evidentiary 
hearing to show that Gandenberger acknowledged and understood Term 3 of his 
Sexual Offender Agreement of Supervision, and that he willfully violated this term by 
initiating, maintaining, or establishing contact with minors. The record thus supports the 
district court's finding that Gandenberger's probation violation was willful. 
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2. The District Court Considered Alternatives To Incarceration 
Even if this Court determines there is not substantial evidence to support the 
district court's finding that Gandenberger's probation violation was willful, this does not 
compel the conclusion that the district court erred in revoking Gandenberger's 
probation. Prior to the 2012 amendment of I.C.R. 33(e), a district court could revoke 
probation for a violation that was not willful if it "determine[d] that alternatives to 
imprisonment [were] not adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate 
interest in punishment, deterrence, or the protection of society." Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 
106, 233 P.3d at 37 (quoting Leach, 135 Idaho at 529, 20 P.3d at 713). 
In this case, the district court considered alternatives to revocation and 
imprisonment. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearings, the district court stated 
that it wished for the probation officer to testify and provide recommendations at the 
disposition hearing. (12/6/11 Tr., p.22, L.20 - p.23, L.23.) At the disposition hearing, 
the probation officer expressed his concern for the difficulty involved with supervising a 
probationer who could have delusions about violating his probation. ( 12/20/11 Tr., p.4, 
Ls.5-15; p.5, L.20 - p.6, L.8.) Specifically, the probation officer testified that if 
Gandenberger was "having a hard time differentiating what's real and not real, that can 
be very dangerous, I think." (12/20/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-8.) The probation officer also 
expressed concern about Gandenberger's living situation, in that Gandenberger had 
been living with a relative who apparently was not familiar with Gandenberger's terms of 
supervision and was hosting barbeques where children were present. (12/20/11 Tr., 
p.4, L.17 - p.5, L.2.) 
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In asking that Gandenberger be placed back on probation, Gandenberger's 
counsel referenced a letter from Gandenberger's psychiatric mental health nurse 
practitioner, written prior to the evidentiary hearings, which recommended that 
Gandenberger be "[p]laced in an assisted living/group living environmenUcertified family 
home," "have a legal guardian," and "attend outpatient treatment to include: medication 
management, day treatment and chronic symptom management treatment." (12/20/11 
Tr., p.29, L.8 - p. 32, L.18; Defendant's Exhibit A.) However, Gandenberger's counsel 
did not provide any specific information or plan regarding any particular alternative living 
arrangement or outpatient treatment. Further, Gandenberger's step-father 
acknowledged at the disposition hearing that he had made no progress in establishing 
himself as Gandenberger's legal guardian in the previous 10 months since he first 
considered that possibility, and that he had not yet looked into any type of alternative 
living arrangement for Gandenberger. (12/20/11 Tr., p.18, L.3- p.19, L.17.) 
The district court recognized its discretion to revoke or continue probation. 
(12/20/11 Tr., p.33, L.25 - p.34, L.11.) The court then expressly discussed the 
disposition alternatives. (12/20/11 Tr., p.35, L.18 - p.38, L.12.) The court was 
appropriately unwilling to continue the status quo of Gandenberger's residency status 
with his step-father in light of evidence that Gandenberger's family "didn't appreciate the 
significance" of Gandenberger's terms of probation. (12/20/11 Tr., p.35, L.23 - p.36, 
L.5.) The district court then considered the alternative disposition recommended by 
Gandenberger's psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, but recognized that it had 
been presented no specific alternative residency options or treatment program. 
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(12/20/11 Tr., p.36, L.16 - p.37, L.20.) Finally, after stating that it had reviewed 
Gandenberger's PSI and criminal record, the court recognized that there was a "public 
safety risk here." (12/20/11 Tr., p.37, L.21 - p.38, L.7.) The court concluded that "the 
best alternative" was to revoke probation, impose the sentence, and order mental health 
treatment pursuant to I.C. § 19-2523. (12/20/11 Tr., p.38, Ls.13-17.) 
The district court considered all of the relevant information, including alternatives 
to incarceration, and reasonably determined that Gandenberger was no longer an 
appropriate candidate for community supervision. Gandenberger has failed to establish 
an abuse of discretion. 
DATED this 9th day of January 2013. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this· Court affirm the district court's order 
revoking probation and ordering his sentence executed. 
/s/ ___________ _ 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
IN RE: AMENDMENTS OF IDAHO 
CRIMINAL RULES (l,C,R,) 6,6, 16, 





The Court having reviewed the recommendations approved by the Criminal Rules 
Advisory Committee and the Administrative Conference to amend Idaho Criminal Rules, 
and the Court having fully considered the same; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Idaho Criminal Rules 
as they appear in the volume published by the Idaho Code Commission be, and they are 
hereby, amended as follows: 
1. That Rule 6.6 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows: 
Rule 6.6 Indictment. 
*** 
(e) Return of no bill. If the grand iury concludes that probable cause is lacking and 
no indictment shall be returned, that fact shall be placed in writing and maintained under 
seal by the court as part of the record of that proceeding. 
2. That Rule 16 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows: 
Rule 16. Discovery and inspection. 
*** 
(d) Redacting protected information from responses to discovery. The party 
































(1) Protected information means: 
A. Contact information. The home addresses, business addresses, 
telephone numbers (including cell phones), and email addresses of an 
alleged victim, or of a witness, or of the spouse, children, or other close 
family members of the alleged victim or witness. and the places where any 
of such persons regularly go, such as schools and places of employment 
and worship. 
B. Personal identifying information. The dates of birth and social 
security numbers of any persons other than the defendant. 
C. Private information. Personal identification numbers (PINs), 
passwords, financial account numbers, information relating to financial 
transaction cards, and medical information protected by federal law that is 
not directly related to the crime charged. 
(2) A prosecuting attorney who redacts protected information shall follow the 
following procedure: 
A. If the defendant is represented by counsel, the prosecuting attorney 
shall serve defendant's counsel with a redacted copy of the discovery 
printed on white paper simultaneously with an unredacted copy of the 
discovery printed on paper of a color that is clearly distinguishable from 
white. The defendant's attorney. including appellate counsel, shall not 
disclose the protected information to the defendant or to a member of the 
defendant's family without the consent of the prosecuting attorney or an 
order of the court upon a showing of need. 
B. If the defendant is not represented by counsel, the prosecuting 
attorney shall serve the defendant with a redacted copy of the discovery 
and, within seven (7) days of doing so, even if the disclosure was not in 
response to a discovery request. shall file with the court and serve upon 
the defendant a motion for a protective order with respect to the redacted 
information. 
(3) A defense attorney or defendant who redacts protected information shall 
serve the grosecuting attorney with a redacted copy of the discovery printed on 
white paper simultaneously with an unredacted copy of the discovery printed on 
paper of a color that is clearly distinguishable from white. The state's attorney. 
including am:i:ellate counsel, shall not disclose the protected information to the 
alleged victim or to a member of the alleged victim's family without the consent 
of the defendant or an order of the court upon a showing of need. 








































3. That Rule 2S(a) be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows: 
Rule 25. Disqualification of judge. 
(a) Disqualification of judge without cause. In all criminal actions, except actions 
before drug courts or mental health courts, the parties shall each have the right to one 
disqualification without cause of the judge or magistrate, except as herein provided, 
under the following conditions and procedures: 
*** 
(6) Alternate judges. If the presiding judge intends to have a panel of 
judges as alternates to try the ease set fer preside at trial or at any other hearing or 
proceeding in the case, a notice or amended notice of trial setting shall include a 
list of judges who may alternatively be assigned to so preside at the trial if the 
presiding judge is unavailable to try the ease. Upon service of the notice as to the 
panel, each party shall have the right to file one ( 1) motion for the disqualification 
without cause as to any altemathre alternate judge or magistrate not later than 
fourteen ( 14) days after service of written notice listing the alternate judge§ or 
magistrate§ 1Nho may preside at the frial ef the ease. Provided, if a party has 
previously exercised the right to disqualification without cause under this Rule 
25(a), that party shall have no right to disqualify an alternate judge or magistrate 
under this subparagraph. 
*** 
4. That Rule 3 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows: 
Rule 33. Sentence and judgment. 
*** 
(e). Revocation of probation. The court shall not revoke probation except after 
hearing at which the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which 
such action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing. 
The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a 
finding by the court. following a hearing. that the defendant willfully violated a condition 
of probation. 
(0. Waiver of fees and costs. 
(1) A person who has been sentenced by the court following a plea of guilty or 
finding of guilt may have his or her probation revoked or be found to be in contempt for 
failure to pay a fine. fee. or costs only if the court finds that the person has willfully 
refused to make such payment, or has failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to legally 
acquire the resources to make such payment. 
(2) A fee or cost imposed by statute on persons who plead guilty to or are found 
guilty of any offense may be waived in whole or part by the court only when there is a 
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1 (3) A court may waive all or part of a fee or costs imposed by statute only upon 'I 
i making findings in writing or on the record that each statutory standard for the waiver of 
I such fee or costs has been satisfied, If the court decides to waive such fee or costs in 
: whole or in part. the court shall make such detennination with regard to each offense on 
i which the defendant is or has been sentenced. and shall determine whether such fee or 






5. That Rule 4l(a) be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows: 
Rule 41. Search and seizure. 
(a) Authority to issue warrant, A search warrant authorized by this rule or 
by the Idaho Code may be issued by ,a district judge or magistrate within the 
judicial district wherein the county of proper venue is located property or persofl. 
soaght is located upon request of a law enforcement officer or any attorney for the 
state of Idaho. Where it does not appear that the property or person sought is 
currently within the territorial boundaries of the state of Idaho. such warrant may 
still be issued: however, no such issuance will be deemed as granting authority to 
serve said warrant outside the territorial boundaries of the State. 
*** 
6. That Rule 43 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows: 
Rule 43. Presence of the defendant. 
(a) Presence required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time 
of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return 
of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise pmvided by this 
rule. 
(b) Continued presence not required. The further progress of the trial to and 
including the return of the verdict, or the progress of any other proceeding. shall not be 
prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived defendant's right to be 
present whenever a defendant, initially present: 
(1) Is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced (whether or not the 
defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to remain during the trial), or 
(2) Who has previously been warned by the court, acts in a manner so 
disorderly, disruptive and disrespectful as to substantially impede or makes impossible 







7. That a Rule 54.1 be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows: 
Rule 54.1 Appeals from a magistrate to a district court-
Appealable judgments and orders, 
*** 
{j) Any order granting or denying a motion to set aside the forfeiture of bail or to 
exonerate bail. An appeal from such an order shall not deprive the magistrate court of 
jurisdiction over other proceedings involving the case or stay such proceedings, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this order and these amendments shall be 
effective the first day of July, 2012. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the above designation of the striking of words 
from the Rules by lining through them, and the designation of the addition of new 
portions of the Rules by underlining such new portion is for the purposes of information 
only as amended, and NO OTHER AMENDMENTS ARE INTENDED. The lining 
through and underlining shall not be considered a part of the permanent Idaho Criminal 
Rules. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall cause 
notice of this Order to be published in one issue of The Advocate. 
DATED this !:j}!_ day of February, 2012. 
(J, ., I , __ _,._ , 
ATTEST: 'f) '~t I '-J,, (" \ __ 









' ' ,, 
! 











I, Stephen W. Kenyon, Qlert( of the Supreme Court 
of the State of Idaho, do hereby certify that the : , 
above Is a true and correct {;Opy of the a [ d C,C i I Clerk / 
entered In the above enlftled CIUl8 and now on : 
record In my office. •1 
WITNE$8 my hand and the _Sul of thlt Court 2=-1)·\l 1 
____ s_r_::_r_,·1_r:_r1_w_._v_,-1:_· l\_P.;..ro_" _N~Cltrk 1J
1 
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